MILP Based Differential Cryptanalysis on IVLBC and Eslice 64

Abstract

Lightweight block ciphers provide security to resource-limited devices. However, many of these ciphers lack security analysis against basic attacks. This paper provides a detailed security analysis of two lightweight block ciphers, IVLBC and Eslice-64, against differential attack. The designers of IVLBC and Eslice-64 claimed that their ciphers were secure against differential attack. In this paper, to substantiate existing cryptanalysis’s claims, we perform differential attack on these two ciphers using the mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) method. We incorporate the difference distribution table (DDT) probabilities into MILP models. We discover differential distinguishers up to seven and 15 rounds for IVLBC and Eslice-64, respectively. We improve the known distinguishers for Eslice-64 by one round. Further, we mount the key recovery attack on an eight-round IVLBC and a 16-round Eslice-64 with data/memory/time complexities of 249/ 250.59/249 and 263/212.58/263 respectively.